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Göttingen  MAGKS The effects of enforced reflection in three simple experiments
by Björn Frank
Abstract
Rubinstein (2007) has recently found that the frequency of (types of) decisions made in
Internet experiments are related to the time taken for these decisions. Other authors have
investigated this relationship by exerting some time pressure. In this paper, I report on an
attempt to do the opposite, i.e., to enforce a longer reflection time. To ensure that subjects do
not just wait but actually think for five minutes, they had to perform a five minutes focused
free writing task. Free writing is a standard method adopted from creative writing courses;
subjects are asked to write up everything that currently runs through their minds, without
pausing.
Enforced reflection significantly decreases the number chosen in beauty contest experiments,
thus increasing the winning probability, and it increases the amount given in the solidarity
game. For women, this increase is economically and statistically significant. The average
amount offered in the ultimatum game is not higher for those who had performed the free
writing task. However, after free writing, the share of 50:50 offers is significantly higher,
which is in conflict with Rubinstein's conjecture that 50:50 offers take less time because they
are instinctive (as opposed to cognitive).
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Spontaneous decisions differ from those that are well-considered. Think of time trouble in
chess, leading strong players to make blunders they otherwise would be sure to avoid (e.g.,
Kotov, 1978, pp. 176 et seq.). However, isn't this well known and unsurprising? Answering
this question with a spontaneous yes might have led even behavioural economists to ignore,
until recently, that a closer look at decision times can produce exciting new insights.
So far, there are two basic research strategies concerning decision time. One is to exert time
pressure on subjects. Decisions with and without time pressure are known to be made by
different parts of the brain. Hence the role of these different parts of the brain in experiments
such as the ultimatum game can be studied by suppressing or activating these brain parts
through time pressure (Cappelletti, Güth and Ploner, 2008; see also Ibanez, Czermak and
Sutter, 2008; Sutter, Kocher and Strauß, 2003).
A second approach is to simply record subjects' decision times. According to an insightful
study by Rubinstein (2007), the frequency of (types of) decisions made in Internet
experiments are related to the time taken for these decisions (see also Piovesan and
Wengström, 2008). This also leads to interesting insights, though below we will argue that
the interpretation is not straightforward.
A third method would be to enforce not a particularly short decision time, but a longer one.
While this nicely complements the other two approached sketched above, the practical
problems seem to be hard to overcome. How can subjects be forced to think longer? Not
permitting them to make their decisions before 10 minutes have passed after reading the
instructions? Many subjects will be bored, and in any case what occupies their minds is
completely beyond the experimenter's control. In this paper, I discuss an attempt to solve this
problem with a method called "free writing"; it is a well known tool in creative writing
workshops, but used for the first time in three standard experiments reported on below: The
ultimatum game, the beauty contest and the solidarity game. The general set-up is described
in section 2, while details for each experiment and their results are given in section 3, where I
will show that in none of the experiments does the subjects' behaviour appear to be entirely
unaffected by this intervention. Section 4 concludes.
2. Basic design
Free writing is a standard method (e.g., Elbow, 1998, ch.1; Marsella and Hilgers, 1991)
adopted from creative writing courses. In free writing tasks, participants are asked to write up
everything that currently runs through their minds, without pausing. Sometimes they are3
asked to start their text with a certain topic; this is called focused free writing. In any case,
participants are asked not to pay attention to grammar and spelling. The aim is to "think onto
the paper" (Elbow, 1991, p.200), avoiding the author's immediate critical review of his or her
own style, i.e. avoiding writer's block. The resulting texts are usually not read aloud, but used
as working material for further exercises (such as a short essay or a haiku).
In the experiments I report on below, focused free writing is used to enforce a certain period
of thinking, or at least associating, on the decision task ahead. Subjects were invited into a
large classroom or lecture hall. The experiment started with a short introduction to free
writing, and a practice period, namely a three-minute free writing text on how they imagine
their upcoming weekend will be. As is usual in free writing task, they were asked not to
pause when writing, and to write anything that runs through their heads, even if this means
just reporting having no ideas, etc. They were told that their texts would not be read aloud
and that they are not obliged to hand them over to the experimenter or someone else.
Thereafter instructions for the experiment were distributed. Subjects were first asked to
participate in a simple pen-and-paper experiment: Experiment A (to be specified in section 3)
for about half of them and experiment B for the others. I thereby obtained the control group
decisions. After completion of the first experiment, subjects were asked to just read the
instructions of a different (second and final) one, but not to make a final decision. This
second experiment was experiment A for those who had previously participated in
experiment B and vice versa. After possible clarifying questions concerning the rules were
answered by the experimenter, participants were asked to perform a five-minute focused free
writing text on the decision ahead. Again, they were told that text would be neither read aloud
nor collected.
When five minutes were over, subjects were told to make their decision, and the sheets on
which they reported their decision (along with an alias allowing them to receive payoffs
while remaining anonymous) were collected.
Payments were made immediately after the experiment; few participants used the option to
collect their payoff later in the office of a person who was not present during the experiment.
It was announced that, as had been promised, I would not collect the free writing text, but that
I offer €2 per text. Most, but not all, participants sold their texts.
1
1 I presume that most participants who did not sell their texts did this because the one on the next weekend and
the one on the experiment were on the same sheet, and the text concerning the next weekend were sometime
pretty intimate.4
Was the free writing method successful in inducing thinking about the task ahead? At least it
did have an effect, although the interpretation might be subject to debate. The next section
reports details on the three experiments.
3. The effects of enforced reflection
3.1. Ultimatum Game
This experiment was performed with 138 first-year students. Seven participants were
randomly assigned to the role of responders in the ultimatum game. The 131 other
participants took the role of the proposers, who had to propose the division of €50. Seven of
the proposals were randomly drawn after the experiment, each of them being matched with
one responder. 67 participants in the role of the proposer constituted the control group: They
made an offer without previous free writing. The experimental group consists of 64 subjects
who made their offer after free writing (the experiment they took part in before their free
writing task is the beauty contest described in section 3.3).
While the proposers filled out their forms, the seven responders were asked to indicate the
minimum acceptable offer. After matching seven randomly drawn offers with the seven
proposer decisions, payments were made (5 offers were accepted). Furthermore, the
experimenter offered to buy the free writing texts for €2 per person. That resulted in 43
complete and 1 incomplete free writing text on the ultimatum game.
Considering the mean offers only, there is hardly any difference between control group and
experimental group (see Table 1). In the control group, the mean offer is €20.72 or 41.44
percent of the stakesize. In the experimental group, the offer is only 3 cents higher.
Cappelletti, Güth and Ploner (2008) had found higher offers in the ultimatum game under
time pressure (15 seconds decision time) compared to a control group with only a moderate
time restriction (180 seconds). One might hypothesize that if an artificially short decision
time increases offers, then artificially increasing decision time might have the opposite effect,
but our results do not confirm this hypothesis.
However, comparing our results to those by Rubinstein (2007) reveals an interesting pattern.
As shown in table 1, the 50% offer was the one that took Rubinstein's subjects the least time
to make. Rubinstein's (2007) explanation of this finding is that a 50:50 split is the
"instinctive" choice by the proposer, as opposed to "cognitive" ones.
An alternative explanation that is supported by Rubinstein's data as well does not rely on the
instinctive versus cognitive distinction. Rather, it is reasonable to presume that many people
start reflecting their offers at 50:50. If they conclude that this is satisfactory, they stop and5
make their offer. If they are not satisfied, they check other options like 51:49 in their favour,
or 60:40. One might call such a mode "stepwise cognitive". For all subjects whose decision
making is thereby reasonably well described, 50:50 offers necessarily take less decision time.
Now what is the likely effect of more reflection? If my reading of Rubinstein (2007) is
correct, his model predicts less 50:50 offers as instinctive decision making is prevented by
enforcing a 5-minute decision period. On the other hand, my "stepwise cognitive"
explanation of Rubinstein's findings does not lead to such a prediction. As shown in table 1,
free writing is increasing, rather than decreasing, the share of 50:50 offers. The difference is
even weakly significant
2, though this would not need to be the case in order to reject the
hypothesis that enforced reflection decreases the share of 50:50 offers.
Table 1: Ultimatum Game: Free writing experiment and Rubinstein's Internet experiment















0-1 0% 0% 54.0 15%
2-25 20% 19% 52.2 9%
26-49 28% 36% 47.9 13%
50 39% 27% 39.6 46%
51-60 11% 16% 49.5 10%




20.75 € 20.72 € ?
n 64 67 4628
3.2. Solidarity Game
One of the reasons why this game was chosen was that I wanted to recruit participants from
an introductory course in game theory, but to confront them with an experiment that was
entirely new to them, unlike the ultimatum game. Belanoff observes one problem some
2 p=0.0967, Fisher's exact probability test, one-tailed.6
students had with free writing: "Poor writers used free writing to record what happened or to
record the result of previous thinking; they did not often use it to tap into the ongoingness of
the unresolved. They seemed unaware of the frayed edges lying under and around their
ideas." (Belanoff, 1991, p.19) This problem is probably intensified when the experiment at
hand is already known to the students, who might then fall into a kind of exam mode.
This experiment was performed with 80 students, 18 of which were recruited from a creative
writing course for first-year trainee teachers, 62 from economics courses.
3
The rules of the solidarity game are simple (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998): Each participant is
randomly assigned to a three-person-group, not knowing the identity of the others. Each
subject has to throw a dice once. If one of the numbers 1, 2, 3, or 4 appears, s/he wins €5
(approximately equal to 10 German marks used in the original experiment by Selten and
Ockenfels, 1998). If one of the numbers 5 or 6 appears, s/he loses and all s/he receives is an
amount that winners in the group donate to the loser(s). Before the dice is thrown, everyone
makes two decisions: First, how much (if any) to donate to the loser if there is one loser in the
group, and second, how much (if any) to donate each loser in the group if there are two.











Control group (n=40) 2.1275 1.345 each 1.450 0.878 each
Experimental group
(n=40)
2.585 1.647 each 2.525 1.538 each
p-value 0.2591 0.1013 0.0932 0.0535
Selten/Ockenfels (1998) 2.46 1.56 3.23 1.94
All p-values derived with a Mann-Whitney-U-test, two-sided
3 9 of the former belong to the control group; the experiment they participated in after focused free writing is the
beauty contest. 12 control group participants from the economics courses wrote their free writing text on a
subject that had nothing to do with any experiment, the others had taken part in the beauty contest after free
writing on that experiment. Due to 4 no-shows, two participants were not members of a proper three-person-
group, which they did not know when they made their decision. As both neither rolled a 5 nor a 6, they simply
received €5 each.7
As shown in table 2, enforced reflection increases the amount given to losers, i.e., it leads to
greater solidarity. For the whole sample, a conventional level of significance is narrowly
missed for the case of two losers (p=0.1013). Considering women only, however, the
difference becomes larger and statistically significant. This finding is well in line with the
observation by Croson and Gneezy (2009) that women's behaviour in experiments is more
situation specific than men's. As a side result, it might be noted that Selten and Ockenfels
(1998) found a gender effect with respect to the amount given that I completely failed to
replicate. Women gave significantly more in their study, while they gave significantly less in
mine.
A final interesting result concerns the structure of the donations. In Selten and Ockenfels
(1998), who have 118 observations, and in my control group (40 observations), nobody gives
more to each of two losers than to one single loser. While this seems natural, Selten and
Ockenfels (1998, p.520) assert that a "possible approach to the problem could have been that
one wants to secure a minimum payoff, say, (..) 2.00 to a loser. In order to achieve this, two
winners would have to give (..) 1.00 each to a single loser and a single winner would have to
give (..) 2.00 to each of the losers." In my experimental group, two (out of 40) subjects reveal
a similar way of reasoning in their texts and finally come to the decision to donate more to
each of two losers than to a single one.
4 This clearly had not been their first idea, it rather
developed during the 5-minute period of free writing.
3.3. Beauty Contest
In this beauty-contest experiment (Nagel, 1995; Bühren, Frank and Nagel, 2009), the winner
is the player whose number is closer than anyone else's to 2/3 of the average number. 95
belonged to the experimental group, making their decision after five minutes of focused free
writing concerning their decision in this experiment. The control group consisted of 99
participants. The winners
5 were awarded €100.
4 This difference between those with the focused free writing phase before their decision and the other
participants is not significant according to Fisher's Exact Probability Test unless my control group is merged
with that of Selten and Ockenfels (1998).
5 Table 3 reports data pooled from three runs of the experiment, and there was a winner determined and paid for
every run separately.8
One might hypothesize that enforced reflection decreases the number chosen in the beauty
contest, as participants are led to think maybe one step further ahead.
6 A number that is often
chosen is 33: 2/3 of the average if everyone else chooses his or her number randomly.
Thinking one step further, one might presume that everyone else has seen this point, hence
one should submit 2/3￿33 = 22. Our results are mixed: While the average number chosen in
the experimental group is by 8.1 lower than in the control group, this is mainly due to the
lower share of guesses between 51 and 100 (table 3); disregarding these observations would
reduce the absolute difference between the two treatments to 2.2. Furthermore, those numbers
that take a long time to be chosen by Rubinstein’s (2007) participants (table 3) were not
chosen markedly more often after enforced reflection via free writing.
Table 3: Beauty Contest: Free writing experiment and Rubinstein's Internet experiment








0-1 2% 1% 91 11%
2-13 9% 5% 89 9%
14￿15 1% 2% 84 2%
16￿21 13% 8% 82 6%
22 5% 4% 157 4%
23￿32 20% 16% 84 10%
33￿34 7% 4% 113 11%
35￿49 21% 22% 94 11%
50 2% 4% 70 16%




n 95 99 2423
6 There are interesting, though contradictory, results from experiments where the decision whether to write a
text or not is left to the participants. Those who did so in a Spanish newspaper beauty contest did not choose a
lower number, while those who took part a popular science magazine’s beauty-contest experiment and decided
to submit a written comment guessed 14.4 on average, compared to 26.8 for the others, see Bosch-DomŁnech et
al. (2002) and the references given therein.9
The beauty contest is a constant sum game in which social preferences play no role (Nagel,
1999, p.107). This is important in that it facilitates the interpretation of the other two
experiments, as the beauty-contest results show that free writing does have an impact on
cognitive decision making (otherwise one might speculate that free writing merely arouses
emotions, though this is not what the participants' texts suggest.)
4. Conclusion
In all these experiments, enforced reflection had a significant impact on the decisions.
7 This
is well in line with the results of other experiments that focus on decision time. Compared to
these approaches, free writing has limitations and strengths. One regrettable limitation is the
lack of complementary neurological research on free writing. As yet, it is simply unknown
which brain areas are activated during free writing. The interpretation of experiments with
time pressure as a treatment variable, such as Cappelletti, Güth and Ploner (2008), is
facilitated by existing evidence on time pressure from cognitive brain research, which is
missing for free writing.
Another limitation is the artificiality of random assignment to control group and experimental
group in the context of decision time. In Rubinstein's (2007) study, it is left to participants to
choose the time they take for deciding. This corresponds to many instances of real world
decision making. However, sometimes circumstances or institutions enforce a certain
minimum duration of the decision time, be it that the law requires a cooling off period after
which an agreement has to be reconfirmed, be it that the physical conditions of
communication between negotiators involves breaks and delays, as in email communication
between different time zones. Hence it is of interest to see that the results of standard
experiments do depend, to some extent at least, on the time frame.
Acknowledgements: I am indebted to participants of the IMEBE, ESA and GfeW conferences 2009 in
Granada, Innsbruck and Essen for helpful comments.
7 Free writing was tried out to solve the problem of increasing subjects' decision time without boring them.
However, a side-effect is that the experimenter is provided with insights into subjects' decision-making
processes. Hence free writing is also an alternative to thinking aloud (Gneezy, Rustichini and Vostroknutov,
2007), videotaping group decisions (Bosman, Hennig-Schmidt and van Winden, 2006) or chat rooms (Burtraw
et al. 2008). However, the analysis of the text that subjects have written is beyond the scope of the present
paper, (but see the last paragraph of section 3.2) and left to future research.10
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